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RESPONSE 
THE IMPOTENCE OF DELAWARE’S TAXES: A RESPONSE TO 
BARZUZA’S DELAWARE’S COMPENSATION 
M. Todd Henderson*
ERHAPS the most hackneyed and intractable debate in all of 
business law concerns the question of whether Delaware has 
incentives to provide an optimal corporate law, whatever that is. The 
world seems divided into the race-to-the-topers and the race-to-the-
bottomers, with increasing amounts of scholarship piling up on both 
sides, none of which seems to be convincing the other side or moving 
policy forward in a meaningful way.1 When asked to respond to the 
latest salvo in this battle, I feared more of the same. But after reading 
Professor Michal Barzuza’s thought-provoking article, Delaware’s 
Compensation,2 I am convinced that there are still interesting things to 
be said about the optimality of the state-as-competitor-for-charters 
model of modern American corporate governance. I do not find 
Professor Barzuza’s proposal for making the franchise tax proportional 
to firm value convincing or necessarily desirable, but, because of the 
natural check provided by state competition, it is unlikely to do much 
harm. 
P 
 
 
 
 
* Assistant Professor, University of Chicago Law School. 
1 See M. Todd Henderson, Two Visions of Corporate Law, 77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
(forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1328343. 
2 Michal Barzuza, Delaware’s Compensation, 94 Va. L. Rev. 521 (2008). 
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Professor Barzuza articulates her thesis as follows: 
If Delaware’s [franchise] tax were more sensitive to firm value, or if 
Delaware increased its tax to reflect changes in the quality of its law, 
the state would have better incentives to invest in quality, even in the 
absence of competition, because Delaware would be rewarded for 
such changes with higher tax collections.3
The idea is that the current system of franchise taxation—basically a 
flat fee of $165,000 for large firms—does not provide legislators with 
sufficient incentives to overcome the ability of managers to lobby for 
management-friendly legislation. Professor Barzuza claims that 
managers dominate the process of incorporation (both at the IPO and 
reincorporation stages), and that legislators rationally favor them over 
shareholders, in part because the benefits from favoring managers are 
real and sizable, while increasing shareholder value does little to attract 
or keep firms and does not increase the state’s $165,000 take. 
Professor Barzuza’s paper makes an important point: taxes are not 
only a form of regulation, but also can be an incentive for efficient 
regulation.4 To see this, compare two worlds in which there is a single 
legislator who writes the rules for firm governance. In the first, much 
like modern-day Delaware, the legislator receives a flat fee from each 
firm to spend on public goods; and in the second, much like Professor 
Barzuza’s imagined Delaware, the legislator receives a large percentage 
of firm profits (say 50%) that the legislator can dole out to constituents. 
All else being equal, it is obvious that the legislator in the second world 
has a stronger incentive to increase firm value, as the benefits flow 
directly to the legislator. 
It is difficult to object to this claim at a theoretical level, since it may 
improve incentives for legislators on the margin, and if the legislators set 
the rate too high or enact changes that actually destroy shareholder 
value, companies will simply move to Maryland or lobby Delaware to 
change back. My guess is, however, that the impact of such a dramatic 
3 Id. at 549. 
4 Alternatively, one might think that taxes are a substitute for regulation, since in most 
cases regulation decreases firm profitability and taxes are effectively a proxy for government 
ownership of a firm. In the case of corporate law, Professor Barzuza claims that regulations 
and taxes are compliments, not substitutes, because certain governance regulations increase 
firm value rather than lowering it. 
  
2009] The Impotence of Delaware’s Taxes 51 
 
change in tax law is likely to be trivial (and potentially harmful for 
Delaware) for two reasons.5
I. 
First, Professor Barzuza’s proposal omits any analysis of the 
legislative process that a proportional tax is designed to influence. There 
are two parts to this, roughly corresponding to the supply and demand of 
legislation. Legislators supply legislation, but Professor Barzuza offers 
no account of their motives to explain why the increase in state revenues 
that would come from a proportional tax would benefit the marginal 
Delaware legislator. On the other side of the coin, managers are part of 
the demand for corporate legislation, but they too are missing from 
Professor Barzuza’s calculus. I consider each in turn. 
A. 
Professor Barzuza notes that Delaware will be rewarded with higher 
taxes and this will encourage it to enact optimal (or more optimal) 
legislation. The problem is that Delaware can act only through its 
legislators, and these individual legislators are missing from Professor 
Barzuza’s account. Without a coherent claim about how legislators 
respond to the various incentives created by the parties in the legislative 
process, the argument she makes is less persuasive. The point here is 
simply that once we move from the single-legislator example above to a 
multi-member body, the calculus of weighing the benefits from a change 
in corporate governance is more complex. For example, do legislators 
only care about the size of the public fisc? Perhaps for some legislators 
sitting on key committees, the ability to pass benefits along to 
constituents may help them get reelected, but for others the opposite 
may be true. Legislators face constituencies with heterogeneous 
preferences, not all of which will view increased state revenues as an 
unmitigated positive. Assuming that the utility function of the marginal 
legislator rises with increased tax revenues seems, at best, overly 
simplistic. Is it not just as likely that legislators in multi-member bodies 
might care about maximizing other things, such as their chance at 
reelection or their personal influence or prestige? Passing shareholder-
5 Professor Barzuza admits that the new tax policy would be a radical change when she 
claims that the federal government might be needed to force the change on an unwilling 
Delaware. Barzuza, supra note 2, at 568. 
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wealth-maximizing legislation may have little to no effect on such 
considerations. 
Legislators who could not (or would not want to) take credit for 
increased state revenues would not be influenced by a proportional tax. 
One might argue that the state could use the increased cash from 
corporate taxes to reduce taxes on other entities, such as individuals. But 
this argument needs a theory of why increased taxation of firms relative 
to individuals is more efficient. Optimizing the mix of tax funding 
sources is a difficult calculation, considering the relative ability of firms 
and individuals to evade taxes (say, through structuring, compliance, or 
leaving the jurisdiction entirely), the impact on incentives to produce 
(that is, the choice between work and consuming leisure), the impact on 
other tax burdens (such as federal taxes and sales taxes), and so on. 
Substituting corporate taxes for individual taxes might seem desirable, 
but it could create unintended consequences or dry up the tax base in 
ways that might make it difficult to replace because of the political 
stickiness of tax rates for both individuals and corporations. 
Another problem on the supply side involves uncertainty about 
whether legislators really have an incentive to prefer higher tax revenues 
over a higher number of incorporated firms. There may in fact be an 
inverse correlation between revenue and the number of charters, and the 
marginal legislator might sensibly prefer to have more companies 
chartered in Delaware than to maximize the treasury (or minimize other 
tax burdens). Maximizing the number of firms may mean more work for 
lawyers, judges, and other service providers in Delaware, and thus 
increase campaign contributions to and the prestige of legislators 
responsible for attracting firms to the state. The public choice 
calculations about what legislators maximize is far from clear, and not 
obviously pointed in the direction of “better” firm governance, even in a 
world of increased monetary incentives for the state as a whole. 
B. 
Professor Barzuza’s account also leaves managers out of the 
legislative process, and thus overestimates the potential impact that 
increased revenues will have on overall legislative incentives. Professor 
Barzuza notes that managers are powerful players in the current 
legislative process (in fact, strong enough to distort it in perverse 
  
2009] The Impotence of Delaware’s Taxes 53 
 
ways),6 but then underestimates the role they will have in objecting to 
any legislation that, while designed to increase shareholder value, may 
destroy manager value. This is especially odd, since the argument for the 
tax change is premised on how powerful managers are. Why would this 
power to influence legislators wane under a new tax regime? 
Presumably the answer is because the legislators now have a larger 
incentive (because of the increased tax revenues) to resist the managers. 
But one must compare the relative impact of the new tax revenues and 
the power of managers in the new world, and it is not at all clear that the 
new incentives will be anywhere near strong enough to make a 
difference. If the ability of managers to resist improvements in the law 
that would increase shareholder value is as significant as Professor 
Barzuza believes, taxes are unlikely to do anything to change the 
situation. To see this, consider a simple example. 
Imagine that the Delaware legislature is considering a bill that would 
require firms to destagger their boards. Professor Barzuza cites evidence 
suggesting that this would increase shareholder value by $40 billion. We 
must consider the gains to legislators from both passage and defeat of 
particular legislation. If the bill is passed, Delaware’s treasury will 
receive $40 billion multiplied by some tax rate, T. Legislators who vote 
for the bill will benefit derivatively from this, receiving some benefit, B, 
for increasing state revenues. B is, by definition, less than $40 billion 
times T, because the gains are divided up among many legislators, there 
exists some question about which legislators get “credit” for bills, and 
the money is flowing to the state (and the people) instead of directly to 
the legislators themselves. 
Managers will try to influence legislators too, by delivering 
benefits—call them B*—to individual legislators. We can measure the 
upper bound of this influence by estimating the value managers would 
have from maintaining the status quo. Professor Barzuza claims that 
firms, acting through managers, do not have incentives to destagger their 
own boards, because managers prefer the private benefits of control, 
which would be diminished if the board were destaggered. To put a 
dollar amount on these private benefits one need only estimate the dollar 
gains managers would share with shareholders if the board were 
destaggered. Assuming managers own, on average, 5% of firm shares, 
the managers would gain about $2 billion from the change ($40 billion x 
6 See Barzuza, supra note 2, at 538–41. 
  
54 Virginia Law Review In Brief [Vol. 95:49 
 
5%), and thus the private benefits of control must exceed that amount. 
This means managers would be willing to pay over $2 billion to avoid 
the legal change; this is the upper limit of B*. 
To determine whether legislators will have incentives to pass 
shareholder-friendly legislation, we simply compare B* to B. B* is likely 
to be much greater than B for an individual legislator, if for no reason 
other than the fact that B* is a direct benefit whereas B is, in most cases, 
an indirect one. In fact, the direct nature of the benefit for legislators 
may be one reason why managers are currently able to exert a 
disproportionate influence on legislators compared with diffuse (and 
generally disinterested) shareholders. 
This approach also allows us to estimate the tax rate necessary for B 
to exceed B*. As noted above, the managers would be willing to “pay” 
$2 billion to legislators to avoid this law to preserve their private 
benefits of control.7 In the extreme, this means that the tax rate, T, 
would have to exceed 5% for legislators to favor the bill. This would be 
an absurdly large percentage of firm value to demand in taxes, and one 
unlikely to be politically feasible. 
II. 
Second, even assuming that these issues are solved, there remains the 
question of how realistic it is for legislators to make judgments about 
what does and does not increase shareholder value. At some level, this is 
what legislators are supposed to do, but Delaware’s corporate code is 
remarkably devoid of governance dictates, and its legislators have little 
experience in this policymaking area. The conceit of the current code is 
to leave it to the parties to contract from a bare base to those changes 
that will improve value. Although the supposition that parties will 
actually bargain or have incentives to strike efficient deals may be 
questioned, it is not at all clear that legislative incentives are the 
problem. After all, how are legislators to measure the merits of various 
academic studies suggesting governance improvements? The literature is 
rife with claims that doing X, Y, or Z will improve shareholder value, 
but also counterclaims on the merits or on theoretical grounds. Empirical 
7 Managers would likely pay, through campaign contributions, lobbying, charitable 
donations, or other means, to defeat the bill. Campaign finance laws are obviously relevant 
here, but managers can use a variety of mechanisms to deliver B* to legislators, including 
ones clearly outside of the reach of even the toughest election laws. 
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scholarship is increasingly impenetrable by non-specialists, and, in the 
event of hearings on the merits of X, Y, or Z, we can be confident that 
there will be as many adamant pros as cons, and even more estimates on 
the potential impact on firm value. 
In addition, there is no way for legislative judgments about the impact 
of X, Y, or Z to be evaluated ex post, since numerous other variables, 
like general economic conditions, competition in the industry, and other 
regulations, may impact firm profitability. This means that there will be 
no (or very noisy) feedback on the efficacy of governance changes and 
the merits of the proportional tax scheme. This may undermine the 
political support for the tax or for particular governance changes, since 
causation will be so uncertain. 
These problems simply raise the question of why legislators should 
prefer making these judgments, instead of leaving them to firm owners 
and managers. It is unlikely that the sum of decision costs and error 
costs is less for legislators and courts than for managers and 
shareholders. Legislators simply have no experience with this kind of 
analysis, as shown by the history of corporate legislation in Delaware. 
Moving to a new paradigm where legislators make governance choices 
will require overcoming this deficiency in skills and information, as well 
as the inertia of the current system. This means that the incentives, 
especially at the beginning of the new regime, will have to be much 
higher than would be necessary in equilibrium. As a result, the political 
resistance to getting such a plan started may be greater than one would 
think if one were simply evaluating the steady-state case, and a new 
regime less likely to emerge than it would be if Delaware legislators 
routinely made corporate governance calculations. 
Unlike legislators, firm stakeholders are betting their own money, 
careers, and reputations, and are likely to know the idiosyncratic 
circumstances of their firms. Firm-specific changes in governance are 
more likely to be narrowly tailored to firm and/or industry 
circumstances, are more likely to be capable of ex post analysis and 
reconciliation, and are more responsive to market forces that will weed 
out good from bad governance choices. In addition, the firm may be the 
only sensible locus of judging governance. Studies showing that certain 
governance changes (for example, smaller boards or separating the chair 
and CEO roles) will increase firm value may be biased by omitting 
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unobservable variables at a firm level,8 and therefore may be yielding 
false results or ones that are not generalizable across all firms. 
In light of these problems, delegating this job to legislators seems 
sensible only if the other mechanisms for enacting governance changes 
that will increase firm value (while not doing other harms) are 
irreparably broken. Instead of giving the power to legislators, who know 
less than managers, shareholders, and creditors, why not advocate 
repealing the Williams Act, changing the rules about how firms repay 
costs in proxy battles, or instituting any number of other reforms that 
would keep the burden on firm stakeholders to make these decisions? 
III. 
Professor Barzuza’s insight makes an important contribution to how 
we think about the interplay between taxes and regulation, and what we 
view as the most appropriate ways to optimize corporate default rules. 
The changes she envisions are unlikely to overcome the managerial 
power she presupposes, however, and in any event are a clear second 
best to a world of few mandatory rules and robust freedom of contract. 
Focusing on improving mechanisms of private ordering, rather than 
getting caught in legislative battles, seems to be a more sensible method 
of improving corporate governance. 
 
8 See, e.g., Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, Boards of Directors as an 
Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature (June 15, 2000), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=233111 (arguing that governance is endogenous and 
studies claiming causal links between performance and governance are plagued by 
unobserved variables). 
